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Production competition has emerged as a major objective
in major weapon systems acquisition. The complexity and length
of the acquisition process, and the expense involved in major
weapon systems requires that early and careful planning be
conducted in order to achieve production competition. In this
study, the researcher defines and identifies the character-
istics and roles of the acquisition strategy, the acquisition
plan, functional implementation plans, and the contracting
strategy. The concept of production competition and the feasi-
ble methodologies for pursuing it are investigated. Contracting
strategy formulation is studied in detail and program issues
that are consistently encountered in contracting strategy
formulation are presented. A methodology for identifying
problem issues in contracting strategy formulation is developed
and analyzed. The study concludes that the role of the con-
tracting officer and the contracting strategy is not suffi-
ciently recognized nor defined in the critical role of integrating
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Production competition has recently emerged as an impor-
tant goal in the acquisition of major weapon systems. It
is, in fact, a legal mandate. Advantages to be derived by
the Department of Defense from competitive procurement include:
- Obtaining a lower price for a product > p-
- Obtaining a higher quality product
- Expanding the industrial base
- Enhancing surge capability in an emergency
- Providing more than one source for product innovation
- Stimulating research and development
- Encouraging efficiency
- Encouraging receptiveness to the concerns of the buyer
and to address criticisms
Production competition can only be achieved as the result
of careful early planning by the Program Manager (PM) and his
supporting acquisition management team. This planning is
documented in the acquisition strategy, acquisition plan, and
various functional implementation plans. One key functional
implementation plan is the contracting strategy as formulated
by the contracting officer. The contracting officer receives
guidance for the contents of the contracting strategy through




This study will investigate and analyze a proposed
methodology that will aid the contracting officer in formu-
lating a contracting strategy for production competition.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this study were: (1) to investigate
the contracting officer's role in acquisition strategy
development, (2) to investigate the concept of the acquisition
strategy and its development, (3) to identify methodologies
for establishing production competition, (4) to identify the
key factors to be considered in contracting strategy formu-
lation, and (5) to develop a methodology for contracting
strategy formulation.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To achieve the objectives of the research, the following
question was posed: What are the key factors that must be
included in the contracting strategy for a major weapon sys-
tem in order to achieve production competition?
To answer the basic research question, the following
subsidiary questions were addressed:
1. What is a contracting strategy, and what is the con-
tracting strategy's role in a major weapon system
acquisition?
2. What are the principal contracting characteristics
of production competition, and what are the feasible
production competition options/alternatives?
3. What contingent characteristics of major weapon
systems acquisition pre-production phases might
substantively jeopardize the structure, nature and
emphasis of the production competition strategy?
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4. What are the contracting issues that must be considered
from a political, legal, economic, and regulatory
perspective in formulating and implementing a production
competition strategy?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this study was obtained from
currently available procurement related literature, personal
interviews with contracting officers and program management
office personnel. Literature was obtained from the Naval
Postgraduate School Library, Defense Technical Information
Center, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange and
applicable regulations, directives, and instructions that
govern the acquisition process. Personnel interviewed during
the research effort are identified in the References and the
interview questions are listed in the Appendix.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study is limited to major systems acquisition as
currently practiced by the Department of Defense (DOD) . The
thrust of the study was on the formulation process of a major
weapon system contracting strategy and its role in implementing
the objectives of the system acquisition strategy. In-depth
study of the various functional implementation plans was
limited to their interrelationship within the umbrella of the
acquisition plan.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The organization of the study is designed to present a
logical progression toward an understanding of the acquisition
13
strategy, acquisition plan, the various functional implementa-
tion plans, and specifically the contracting strategy as
formulated to achieve production competition. Chapter II
presents a conceptual discussion of the major weapon system
environment, the acquisition process, and the aforementioned
strategies and plans. Chapter III introduces the concept of
production competition and discusses the feasible options/
alternatives of establishing production competition. Chapter
IV identifies major weapon system acquisition program issues
which the research consistently encountered in contracting
strategy formulation, and applies those issues to the various
production competition alternatives. A methodology for identi-
fying potential areas of concern in contracting strategy
formulation is thereby developed. Chapter V applies this
methodology to two actual programs in order to analyze its
utility. Finally, Chapter VI provides the conclusions and
recommendations developed as a result of this study, provides
answers to the research questions, and provides recommendations
for further study.
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II. THE CONTRACTING STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this chapter to bring the contracting
strategy in major weapon systems acquisition into perspective.
The framework for investigation into the contracting strategy
will be created first by a discussion of the environment and
the process of major weapon systems acquisition. Next, the
acquisition strategy will be defined and discussed in relation
to its role in the major weapon systems acquisition process.
Finally, the contracting strategy will be defined. Its func-
tion and considerations will be presented to establish its
position and role within the overall process.
B. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
Major weapon systems are acquired by the Department of
Defense (DOD) to provide operational military forces hardware
resources that will enable them to accomplish DOD objectives
and policies. Operational requirements are established by
analyses of threats, mission area analyses, and net assessments
of capabilities and shortfalls. When it is determined that
operational requirements exceed existing capabilities, new
programs are initiated. [Ref. l:p. 2-1] The Military Depart-
ments have been delegated responsibility for managing the
acquisition programs for major weapon systems. [Ref. l:p. 2-10]
15
1. The Major Weapon System Acquisition Players
Acquiring these major weapon systems is a complex
and challenging process [Ref. l:p. 1-1]. Significant players
have emerged that affect the planning and execution of defense
acquisition programs. The President establishes overall
national security policies and objectives. [Ref. l:p. 2-3]
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has the responsi-
bility to develop the strategy to expand, modernize, and support
the forces to carry out the President's policies and objec-
tives. It also has the responsibility for establishing
acquisition policy to ensure that major programs are initiated
in response to specific needs and are prudently managed. [Ref. 1
p. 2-10] The Military Departments implement OSD policies,
develop system micro-acquisition strategy, and assign Program
Managers (PM) to conduct specific programs. [Ref. l:p. 2-3]
Congress authorizes and appropriates the money for defense
programs. In recent years, it has become steadily more in-
volved in the details of the acquisition process. It has added
specific constraints and objectives to certain individual pro-
grams in authorization and/or appropriation bills. [Ref. 1:
p. 2-3] Industry is an inherent player in the process, since
it participates through contractual relationships with the
Military Departments. [Ref. l:p. 2-3]
At the hub of the major weapon system acquisition
process is the Program Manager (PM) . He is the primary
advocate of the program. The Military Department charters the
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PM to exercise technical and business/financial management
for the accomplishment of the program objectives within
approved constraints and thresholds. [Ref. 2:p. 2-1] In
order for the PM to successfully manage his program, functional
support must be provided by specialists such as a business/
financial manager, a logistics manager, a technical manager/
systems engineer, and a contracting officer. [Ref. 2:p. 2-11]
The PM and his supporting functional specialists must con-
tinually take into account the roles, concerns, and possible
actions of players in the Executive and Legislative Branches,
DOD, Military Departments, and industry while planning,
developing, and executing a major weapon system acquisition
program. [Ref. l:p. 2-1]
2 . Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Guidelines
The statutory base upon which the major weapon systems
acquisition process has evolved is the Armed Serivces Procure-
ment Act (ASPA) of 1947 [Ref. 3:pp. 6-8]. Since enactment,
changes have been continually made in response to emerging
problems, national social and economic issues, annual authori-
zation and appropriation directives, and other legislative
acts and executive orders. This has resulted in a "system"
built upon a fragmented collection of statutes, policies,
and implementing regulations with narrow application to resolve
many individual problems. [Ref. 3:p. 6] In addition to the
basic statute, over four thousand other legistlative provisions
affect the procurement process. [Ref. 3:p. 8] Procurement
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legislation has increased in recent years with significant
impact upon the major weapon systems acquisition environment.
Among the significant areas affected include the requirement
for warranties on major weapon systems [Ref . 4] , and the
elimination of the preference for formal advertising [Ref. 5]
Sealed bidding is now preferred, with competitive negotiation
to be used when sealed bidding is not practical. Competition
is required, and organizational competition advocates have
been established. [Ref. 5]
C. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
1 . Evolution
The major weapon systems acquisition process, as
currently practiced, emerged from a study by the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel in 1970, and the promulgation of DOD Directive
5000.1, titled Major Weapon System Acquisitions, in 1971.
The evolution further progressed with the issuance of Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109, titled Major
Weapon System Acquisitions, in 1976. The policies and guide-
lines expressed in these documents form the basis for all
subsequent procedural directives and instructions regulating
DOD acquisition of major weapon systems. They enable the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) , aided by the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) , to guide and control the
development and production of major weapon systems through
top management oversight of a series of acquisition phases,
18
milestone reviews, and decision points. Figure 2.1 is a
representation of the major weapon systems acquisition
process.
2 . Phases and Milestone Reviews
The acquisition of a new major weapon system begins
with either an identified deficiency in an existing capa-
bility, a decision to establish new capabilities in response
to a technologically feasible opportunity, a significant
opportunity to reduce the DOD cost of ownership, or in
response to a change in national defense policy [Ref. 4:
p. 4].
The military Service documents the need for the major
weapon system by preparing a Justification for Major System
New Start (JMSNS) and submits it into the Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS) process with the Service Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) for the year in which the funds
are requested. SECDEF approval establishes the mission need
determination and authorizes the military Service to initiate
the program when the funds are available.
The first phase is the Concept Exploration (CE) phase.
During this phase, several contracts are awarded to industry
to identify and investigate alternative system design concepts
that will satisfy the mission need. At the conclusion of the
CE phase, the PM recommends that one or more of the alternative
design concepts be carried forward into the Demonstration and

























Source: Adapted from [Ref. 2:p. 1-13]
Figure 2.1. Major Weapon System Acquisition
Phases and Milestones
20
System Concept Paper (SCP) which summarizes the results of
the CE phase and describes the program's acquisition strategy
The SECDEF, aided by the DSARC, uses the SCP to make the
Milestone I decision. Approval signifies a validation of
the requirement and is authorization to proceed with the
D&V phase with the most promising concepts. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
The purpose of the D&V phase is to further develop
and validate the alternative concepts to determine which
concept (s) should progress into the Full Scale Development
(FSD) phase. This involves demonstration of the system or
critical subsystems to verify performance and potential suita-
bility of the concept to fill the mission need. [Ref. 2:
p. 1-15] The results of the D&V phase are submitted to the
DSARC for the Milestone II decision point. Documentation
includes a Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) /Integrated
Program Summary (IPS) , which expand the information in the
SCP and provides more detailed program data. SECDEF/DSARC
approval authorizes the program to proceed into the FSD phase
The purpose of the FSD phase is to produce a fully
tested, documented, and production-engineered design of the
selected concept [Ref. 2:p. 1-15]. Activities in this phase
include an engineering subphase, a prototype subphase, and
a pilot-production/transition to production subphase. The
final milestone decision point, Milestone III, is to decide
to proceed into the Production and Deployment phase. The
decision is delegated to the Service Secretary, provided the
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thresholds established at Milestone II are met. The decision
is based upon a review of the updated DCP/IPS and the up-
dated acquisition strategy. [Ref. 4: p. 5] The acquisition
process terminates at the end of the Production and Deploy-
ment phase.
D. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION STRATEGY
The first function of management is the development of
a series of plans that establish the framework within
which future activities will be conducted. [Ref. 6:p. 451]
More than any other single factor, careful planning is
the hallmark of a successful program. [Ref. 2:p. 3-15]
Problems incurred in a program are inversely propor-
tional to the amount of planning. [Ref. 2:p. 3-15]
One of the major weapon systems acquisition management
objectives stated in OMB Circular A-109 is to tailor an
acquisition strategy for each program. This is to be accom-
plished as soon as the agency decides to solicit alternative
design concepts that could lead to the acquisition of a new
major system. The acquisition strategy is to be refined as
the program proceeds through the acquisition process. [Ref. 7;
p. 5] DOD 5 00 0.1 directs that DOD components shall achieve
program stability through five procedures, one of which is to
[Ref. 4:p. 2]
:
Develop an acquisition strategy at the inception of
each major acquisition that sets forth the objectives,
resources, management assumptions, extent of competition,
proposed contract types, and program structure (such as
development phases decision milestones, test and evalua-
tion periods, planned concurrency, production releases)
and tailors the prescribed steps in the major system
acquisition decision making process to this strategy.
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1 . Definitions
Procurement literature and conversation within and
outside of the Government frequently utilize the terms
acquisition planning, acquisition plan, and acquisition
strategy synonymously. Therefore, for the purposes of this
thesis, the following definitions are presented:
a. Acquisition planning is the process by which the
efforts of all personnel responsible for an acqui-
sition are coordinated and integrated through a
comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need
in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost. It
includes developing the overall strategy for
managing the acquisition. [Ref. 8:p. 7-1]
b. The acquisition strategy is the conceptual basis
of the overall plan that a Program Manager follows
in program execution. It is the framework for
planning and directing the program. [Ref. 1:
p. 1-1] Broadly treated at the inception of a
program where many options are available, it
evolves through an iterative process into a plan
which describes the interweaving of business,
technical, and other aspects of the program and
identifies the requisite actions by the Program
Manager for achieving program objectives.
[Ref. 9:p. 1]
c. The acquisition plan specifically addresses the
immediate procurement action. [Ref. l:p. 4-5]
It integrates and summarizes information found in
more detail in the various program functional
plans. It becomes increasingly detailed as the
acquisition progresses.
d. Functional implementation plans present the specific
actions, concerns, and schedules relating to a
particular functional area. They contain short-
term tasks, inputs, outputs, schedules, sub-
milestones, and man-loading. In other words, they
are the detailed plans for implementing the
applicable broad-based portion of the acquisition
strategy. They, too, are updated as the acquisi-
tion progresses. [Ref. 2:p. 4-4] Examples of
functional implementation plans include the
Business/Financial Management Plan, the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan, the Test and Evaluation
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Master Plan, and the Systems Engineering Master Plan.
Other functional plans may be required, depending upon
the circumstances of the acquisition.
To summarize the relationships between- the acquisition
strategy and the various plans, acquisition planning is
employed to formulate and integrate the acquisition strategy
and all other associated functional plans. The acquisition
strategy provides the broad issues to be addressed throughout
the life of the program. [Ref. l:p. 4-5] The functional
implementation plans contain the planning details for achieving
acquisition strategy objectives in a particular functional
area. The acquisition plan integrates and summarizes the
various functional plans into a detailed overall functional
plan that addresses the immediate procurement action.
2 . Acquisition Strategy Characteristics/Maintenance
The primary purpose of a major weapon system acqui-
sition strategy is to provide a coordinated approach to
accomplishing program objectives in a timely and economical
manner [Ref. l:p. 3-1]. It is the baseline from which all
functional plans are developed. It provides the groundrules
and assumptions under which the program was initiated. It
identifies, evaluates, and selects important issues, func-
tional requirements, and critical decision windows. It
provides an agreement upon the plans and activities of the
program between the Program Manager and the Military Depart-
ment. It can also be utilized to establish support for a
program with OSD, the President, and/or the Congress.
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[Ref. l:p. 3-2] In its broadest conceptualization, an acqui-
sition strategy identifies and addresses the integration of
strategic, technical, and resource concerns in- order to
define program objectives and to achieve program direction
and control. [Ref. l:p. 3-3]
OMB Circular A-109 directs that major weapon systems
acquisition strategies be refined as the program proceeds
through the acquisition process [Ref. 7:p. 5]. Three situa-
tions have been identified as being primary instigators of
acquisition strategy updates of modications: (1) program
changes or problems, (2) insufficient resources, and (3)
acquisition cycle phase changes. [Ref. l:p. 4-8]
E. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS CONTRACTING STRATEGY
1 . General
The acquisition strategy provides the conceptual
framework for program execution. It addresses strategic,
technical, and resource areas of concern. The strategic
areas of concern provide the basis upon which tailored
approaches can be developed to address the elements in the
technical and resource areas of concern. These tailored
approaches are termed functional strategies. They include
areas such as design, test and evaluation, production,
deployment, personnel and organization, schedule, business/
financial, management information, and facilities. [Ref. 1;
pp. 3-2,9] These functional strategies always receive their
direction, priorities, and constraints from the acquisition
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strategy. [Ref. l:p. 3-5] Various functional specialists
supporting the Program Manager develop these functional
strategies and translate them into functional implementation
plans. These functional implementation plans are then inte-
grated into an overall acquisition plan. The acquisition
plan implements the objectives of the acquisition strategy
via the detailed functional strategies to the instant procure-




The contracting strategy is the procurement portion
of the business/financial functional strategy. It provides
immediate detailed approaches to acquisition strategy con-
tractually-related resource concerns.
3 Considerations and Components
No definitive guidance for development of a separate
and formal functional strategy for contracting was encoun-
tered. Interviewees included in the References stated
that they utilized their experience and the existing program
circumstances in formulating a contracting strategy. Con-
siderations and components of a contracting strategy must
be extracted from OMB Circular A-109, Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) Part 7 on acquisition planning, DOD FAR
Supplement Part 7 on acquisition plans, and applicable Service
supplements, directives, and instructions. Key considera-
tions in a contracting strategy are that it be consistent
with program objectives and within the framework and direction
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of the acquisition strategy. It should also serve to inte-
grate the other functional strategies into a cohesive acqui-
sition plan that addresses the instant procurement action.
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the
environment and process of acquiring major weapon systems.
The complexity, length, and cost of a major weapon system
program requires early and careful planning. The develop-
ment and maintenance of a formal planning document that
provides the broad conceptual framework for the execution
of the program throughout its life is critical.
The acquisition strategy provides the broad direction,
priorities, and constraints to the development of the
various functional strategies. These functional strategies
implement the acquisition strategy in the short term for the
instant procurement action in their specific functional
area. When integrated, they constitute the acquisition plan.
The contracting strategy is a critical functional strategy
that enumerates the contractually related objectives and
plans and should integrate the other functional strategies.
A contract can thereby be formed that bridges the gap between
the Government (buyer) and Industry (seller)
.
There is no formal guidance for the preparation of a
contracting strategy. Additionally, there is not a require-




This chapter will introduce and define the concept of
competition in the major weapon systems acquisition environ-
ment. The statutory and regulatory basis for the preference
for competition is introduced, and the relatively recent
emphasis upon production competition is presented. The last
section of the chapter will present the recognized methods for
establishing alternative sources for production of major
weapon systems. Each method will be briefly described,
followed by advantages and disadvantages that have been attributed
to each. An understanding of these second sourcing methodolo-
gies is necessary to discuss the development and implementation
of contracting strategies that have production competition as
a goal
.
B. COMPETITION IS A LEGAL MANDATE
The concept of competition has long been imbedded in
American society. It is a legal and regulatory mandate in
the acquisition of defense goods and services. [Ref. 10:
p. 1-3] The DOD and Congress have historically expressed
preference for competition through legislation, regulations,
and instructions.
Congressional preference for competition is expressed
through legislation. The statutory base for the major weapon
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systems acquisition process, ASPA 1947, requires that con-
tracts for property or services be formally advertised.
Negotiation is to be used only under specific circumstances,
and it must be competitive whenever practicable. [Ref. 10:
p. 1-3] There have been numerous subsequent legislative
initiatives designed to further increase competition. The
Competition In Contracting Act of 19 84 (CICA) amended ASPA
placing further emphasis upon competition and made far reaching
procedural changes to implement that emphasis. [Ref. 5] It
requires the use of competition, except under seven unusual
circumstances. As previously discussed, sealed bidding is
now the preferred procurement method, however competitive
negotiation is now on equal footing, since CICA eliminated
the exceptions allowing negotiation.
Recently, Congressional interest in production competi-
tion has been reflected. The DOD Appropriations Act of 1984
directs that major weapon acquisition programs cannot enter
FSD until SECDEF has provided Congress either a plan for the
development of two or more production sources or a certifi-
cation that the quantities being procured are not sufficient
to warrant development of two or more production sources.
[Ref. 4] CICA also enhanced the ability to develop production
competition by enabling the head of an agency to exclude a
particular source from competitive procedures in order to
develop or maintain an alternate source or sources of supply
[Ref. 5]
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The Executive Branch and DOD have reflected the prefer-
ence for competition in their policy and procedures imple-
menting memoranda, directives, and instructions. OMB Circular
A-109 directs the incorporation of competition throughout
the acquisition for major weapon systems. [Ref. 7:p. 8]
The FAR and the DOD FAR Supplement direct, in Subparts 14
and 15, that contracts shall be awarded on a competitive
basis. DODD 5000.1 directs effective competition as one of
the primary acquisition principles. [Ref. 4:p. 2]
Effective production competition is, therefore, required
by law and regulation in the acquisition of major weapon
systems, whenever practicable. It is an issue that must be
addressed in a major weapon system contracting strategy.
C. DEFINITIONS
Various concepts and types of competition must be defined
in order to clarify further discussion in this effort:
1. Competition is defined as rivalry among companies for
markets. [Ref. l:p. 5-2]
2. Price competition is based upon the lowest offered price
when market analysis reveals equal or similar products
will satisfy a particular need. Evaluation is based
upon price alone. [Ref. ll:p. 156]
3. Design competition is present when two or more companies
develop competing conceptual, technical design approaches
to satisfy a need. [Ref. l:p. 5-2] It involves
development of competing solutions to a mission need.
[Ref. 10:p. 1-8]
4. A multiple factors competition is based upon price,
cost, and other factors such as design, performance,
service, delivery, technical, and management capability.
[Ref. ll:p. 156]
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5. Production competition is present when two or more
companies bid or propose to secure all or part of a
production contract [Ref. l:p. 5-2]. It involves
maintaining multiple suppliers of identical or function-
ally identical equipment. [Ref. 10 :p. 1-11] Production
competition can also be viewed in light of the number
of production sources and the number of competitions
held. The number of production sources refers to the
number of sources maintained over time, such as
winner-take-all or split-buy. [Ref. 10 :p. 1-13]
The number of competitions held refers to the number
of times during the production phase that competi-
tive awards are made. [Ref. 10 :p. 1-13]
D. ESTABLISHING COMPETITIVE PRODUCTION SOURCES
There are five recognized methods for transferring pro-
duction technology and establishing competitive production
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sources. These are: (1) Form, Fit, and Function (F )
,
(2) Technical Data Package (TDP) , (3) Leader-Follower,
(4) Licensing, and (5) Contractor Teaming. [Ref. l:p. 5-3]
These methodologies are not always appropriate to the program
circumstances. The benefits of competition at levels other
than the prime contractor may be more effective. It has been
stated that competition at the prime contractor level has
little effect if a large portion of the system is subcon-
tracted, since the prime contractor would control only a small
portion of the costs. [Ref. 10 :p. 2-21] Production competi-
tion of key subsystems or components may serve to better
realize the benefits of competition. Design competition is
another method under which production can be competitively
obtained.
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1. Form, Fit, and Function
3
The Form, Fit, and Function (F ) technique involves
the solicitation of alternative suppliers based upon perfor-
mance and interface specifications, allowing maximum design
and manufacturing flexibility [Ref. 10 :p. 2-1]. The poten-
tial second source is provided functional specifications
that define parameters such as overall performance, size,
weight, external configuration, mounting provisions, and
interface requirements. This is the classic "black-box"
concept. [Ref. 12 :p. 13] It is not necessary to define
the internal workings of the system. This technique has
been successful for the acquisition of expendable, non-
repairable items whose successful performance does not
depend upon its internal design. [Ref. 12 :p. 13]
3
The advantages of F include [Ref. 10: p. 2-2; Ref. 12
pp. 13,14]
:
a. No technical data package is required.
b. The contractor assumes total design responsibility.
c. Contractor-to-contractor interface is not required.
d. Only minimal Government technical capability is
required.
e. There is a maximum potential unit production cost
reduction due to competition, particularly with
parallel development.
f. Performance and interoperability are possible.
3The disadvantages of F include [Ref. 10 :p. 2-3;
Ref. 12; p. 14]:
32
a. Each procurement requires development effort, except
for off-the-shelf items, which requires additional
time and money.
b. Contractors unaware of the real effort required
to meet the F^ specification are likely to be the
lowest offerors.
c. Careful specification of all external parameters
and interface requirements is required to ensure
interchangeability
.
d. System performance or interface instability impairs
F^ effectiveness.
e. End items with different internal design populate
the inventory, requiring different spare parts and
test equipment.
f. Spare parts may be monopolistically priced by the
manufacturer of each unique configuration.
2 . Technical Data Package
The Technical Data Package (TDP) method involves the
utilization of a stand-alone technical data package to
solicit production proposals from potential alternative
manufacturers [Ref. 12:p. 14]. They may or may not have
participated in the system development or initial production.
This method is dependent upon a data package that, by itself,
is sufficiently detailed, yet universally acceptable for any
alternative manufacturer to use in producing the system. The
data package is obtained through invocation of a data rights
clause or the outright purchase of the data. The Government,
once in possession of a data package, must validate its
adequacy.
Advantages of TDP with independent verification
include [Ref. 10:p. 2-6;Ref. 12:p. 14J
:
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a. Possession of an adequate TDP enables the Govern-
ment to maintain a competitive environment through-
out the life of the program.
b. Second sourcing procedures are relatively simple
after obtaining an adequate TDP.
c. Contractor-to-contractor interface is eliminated.
Disadvantages of TDP include [Ref. 10:pp. 2-6,2-7;
Ref . 12:p. 14]
:
a. It is not suited for highly complex systems or
systems with unstable designs or technologies.
b. The TDP alone may not adequately transfer the
manufacturing technology, i.e., skills and
processes
.
c. Once the Government accepts and validates the TDP,
it assumes responsibility for its accuracy and ade-
quacy. Any defects could result in delays and/or
claims from the second source.
d. TDP ' s are difficult to obtain due to contractor's
assertions of proprietary data.
3 . Leader-Follower
The Leader-Follower technique establishes a second
source through direct contractor-to-contractor transfer of
technical data [Ref. 10:p. 2-9]. The FAR considers it an
extraordinary procurement, and in Subpart 17.4 restricts
its use to the following circumstances [Ref. 8]:
(1) The leader company has the necessary production
know-how and is able to furnish required assistance
to the follower.
(2) No other source of supply can meet the Government's
requirements without the assistance of the leader
company.
(3) The assistance required of the leader company is
limited to that which is essential to enable the
follower company to produce the items.




The FAR also prescribes three methods in which to
accomplish Leader-Follower technology transfer [Ref . 8]
:
(1) Award a prime contract to the leader company, obli-
gating it to subcontract a designated portion of
the items to a specified follower company, and to
assist it to produce the items.
(2) Award a prime contract to the leader company for
the required assistance to the follower company,
and a prime contract to the follower company for
production of the items.
(3) Award a prime contract to the follower company,
obligating it to subcontract with a designated
leader company for the requisite assistance.
Advantages of the Leader-Follower method include
[Ref. 10:p. 2-10; Ref. 12:p. 16]
a. It provides a technique for transferring all or
part of the production of a complex system to a
second source.
b. Competition can be utilized to determine the
acquisition split award to each qualified producer
when two or more sources are maintained.
c. Government liability associated with the technology
transfer is limited.
The disadvantages of Leader-Follower include [Ref.
10:p. 2-10; Ref. 12:p. 16; Ref. 13:p. 6-5]:
a. If proprietary/patented data and techniques are
involved, it resembles Directed Licensing.
b. It may be difficult to motivate the leader to
participate.
c. It may have limited economic benefit as a competi-
tive strategy.
d. It may require complex contractual relationships
between the parties. The Government may have to
mediate conflicts.
e. It is difficult to maintain Government configuration
control.
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f. There are no royalty or assistance fee provisions.
There is no licensing protection.
4 . Directed Licensing
Directed Licensing involves either the inclusion of
a clause in the development contract or a later negotiation
whereby the Government reopens follow-on production competi-
tion [Ref. 12:pp. 14-15]. A potential second source is
designated a licensee to the developing contractor (licensor)
.
The developer, in return for a royalty or fee, provides manu-
facturing data and technical assistance to enable the licensee
to become a qualified producer of the system. The developer
retains the rights to all proprietary data and maintains system
responsibility. The licensee has only the granted permission
to manufacture the system, and normally may only use the tech-
nology for the one program. There has also been a trend
whereby the developer chooses his own licensee, subject to
Government approval. [Ref. 10: p. 2-13
J
The advantages of Directed Licensing include [Ref.
10:p. 2-14; Ref. 12:p. 15; Ref. 13]:
a. A substantial portion of the development is funded
by private investment.
b. The potential for production is maintained through-
out the acquisition cycle.
c. The Government is not closely involved with the tech-
nology transfer process.
d. The developer has protection as to how, or in what
markets, the licensee may sell the product. The
developer may also be compensated for each item the
licensee produces.
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The disadvantages of Directed Licensing include [Ref.
10:p. 2-15; Ref. 12:p. 15; Ref. 13:p. 6-4]:
a. The Government may be unable to break the licensee
away from the developer.
b. Limited economic benefit from competition due to fees
and/or royalties.
c. Limited Government configuration control.
d. Technical transfusion is slow, since the developer
retains data rights.
e. Developer controls the ultimate success of the tech-
nology transfer and the schedule of the first produc-
tion competition.
f. Potential licensees may only participate in order to
obtain the developer's technology.
5 . Contractor Teaming
In Contractor Teaming, potential sources form teams
of two or more contractors, either by a prime-subcontractor
relationship or as a separate entity or joint venture [Ref.
10:p. 2-17]. The teams then compete in the system development
through FSD. The winning team selected for production ex-
changes technical data and manufacturing technology. During
the initial production run, each contractor must demonstrate
the capability to produce the entire system. The team rela-
tionship is then dissolved, and the contractors compete for
follow-on production contracts.
The advantages of Contractor Teaming include [Ref. 10:
p. 2-18; Ref. 12:p. 16; Ref. 13:p. 6-3]:




b. No royalties or fees are involved.
c. Technical success is enhanced by the efforts of two
contractor's design talent.
d. Government liability of technical data is limited.
e. Potentially can result in production competition in
the first production lot.
f. A good competitive base is established very early in
the equipment life cycle.
The disadvantages of Contractor Teaming include
[Ref. 10:pp. 2-18,19; Ref. 12:p. 16; Ref. 13:p. 6-3]:
a. The design phase is more costly, since at least two
contractors are involved with each proposal.
b. The Government may have to resolve technical/contractual
conflicts within the team. It is a complex arrangement.
c. It requires substantial Government effort to maintain
configuration control.
d. FSD division of labor must be overcome to allow inde-
pendent production of the complete system by both
contractors
.
e. There is weak Government leverage to maintain the
partnership throughout the technology transfer process.
f. The team may attempt to behave as a single monopolis-
tic entity.
g. Care must be exercised concerning antitrust problems.
6 . Component Breakout
Production competition at lower tiers can be effected
by various means. The most common techniques employed in-
volve either requiring the prime contractor to develop the
subsystem/component alternative sources, or the PMO breaks
out the subsystem/component and conducts a separate production
for them directly with the suppliers. [Ref. 10 :p. 2-22]
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The prime contractor can be required to identify key
subcontracted subsystems and/or components and to procure them
competitively. Under this method, the prime contractor con-
ducts the competition, performs source selection, and procures
the subsystem/component subject to Government approval. The
prime contractor assumes full responsibility for the equipment
and for qualification. of the second source. The prime contrac-
tor then integrates the subcontracted subsystems/components
and delivers them to the Government as contractor-furnished
equipment (CFE) . [Ref. 10 :p. 2-23]
The other approach to subtier production competition
requires more PMO involvement. Under this approach, the PMO
identifies key subcontracted subsystems/components and con-
ducts production competition strategies directly with suppliers.
Any of the technology transfer techniques may be utilized to
pursue subtier production competition, depending upon the
circumstances surrounding the subsystem/component. The PMO
then provides the subsystem/component to the prime contractor
for integration as Government-furnished equipment (GFE)
.
[Ref. 10 :p. 2-24J This approach enables the Government to
obtain the subsystem/component at a competitive price while
reducing the overhead and fee layering of the prime contractor.
There are, however, disadvantages to the GFE approach. Much
more PMO involvement is required to manage the additional sub-
system/component suppliers in addition to the prime contractor.
Additionally, Government administration of the subsystem/component
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contracts is increased, since these contracts must receive the
same contract administration as the prime contract, and the
subsystem/component must be tested and accepted by the
Government. Another disadvantage is the increased risk and
liability assumed by the Government by certifying the sub-
sytem/component . If the prime contractor encounters
difficulty in integrating the GFE due to schedule or design/
performance deficiencies, the Government may be held liable
for the deficiencies. [Ref. 10 :p. 2-24]
7 . Design Competition
Production competition for a major weapon system can
be established by conducting parallel design competition
through FSD. At the end of the FSD phase, the contractor
with the best technical approach within affordable costs is
awarded the production contract. The disadvantage to this
approach is that while the initial production contract is
competitive, the developer is subsequently the sole source.
In order to maintain production competition after the first
production contract, the methodologies for establishing
second sources described earlier must be initiated. Addi-
tionally, early planning and actions must have been accom-
plished in order to promptly establish additional sources
under these methodologies, such as obtaining an accurate
TDP and unlimited rights to the data, negotiating future





This chapter has introduced the concept of competition in
major weapon systems acquisition. Congress and DOD have
rejuvenated their long-standing interest and emphasis upon
competition. This attention has focused upon competition in
the major weapon systems acquisition production phase. DOD
is now required by law to plan for developing alternative
production sources before entering the FSD phase of the major
weapon systems acquisition cycle. Planning for production
competition is, therefore, a significant factor in developing
and implementing a major weapon system contracting strategy.
Several methodologies for establishing alternative pro-
duction sources have been presented. These methodologies
provide different characteristics, advantages, and disad-
vantages as acquisition vehicles for achieving a production
competition environment. They must be closely analyzed in
relation to the objectives of the acquisition strategy and
overall program issues. A direction can then be identified
toward formulation of the contracting strategy.
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IV. MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM CONTRACTING STRATEGY FORMULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate issues and
methodologies involved in formulating a contracting strategy
for a major weapon system acquisition. Contracting issues
in early major weapon system acquisition cycle phases related
to establishing a future environment for production competi-
tion will be discussed. At some point in the major weapon
system acquisition process, a decision must be made as to
which of the available methods presented in Chapter III for
establishing alternative production sources will be employed.
This decision process is briefly discussed. Once the deci-
sion is reached, it is incorporated into the system acquisition
strategy as a program objective. Functional strategies that
implement the selected methodology must then be formulated and
integrated into an acquisition plan. The final sections of
this chapter will discuss the role of the contracting strategy.
Contracting officers interviewed indicated that there is
no definitive guidance on formulating a contracting strategy.
Most stated that they are usually the final reviewer of the
proposed functional strategies. The contracting officer then
used his best efforts to preclude conflicts between the func-
tional strategies and his tentative contracting intentions.
After resolving any conflicts and incorporating the contracting
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strategy, an acquisition plan was established. Interviewees
preferred no formal guidance on contracting strategy formula-
tion and review. They stated that they needed- freedom of
judgment and flexibility to work within the unique and changing
circumstances of each program.
The researcher will analyze techniques that allow a con-
tracting officer to formulate a contracting strategy by
integrating program issues from the various functional
strategies and then analyzing the potential suitability of
the selected method for establishing alternative production
sources for accommodating those program issues.
B. CREATING A COMPETITIVE CONTRACTUAL ENVIRONMENT
"No decision is isolated in time; every move opens some
future opportunity for decision, and forecloses others.
Therefore, every decision commits positively or negatively,
and at the same time, reduces future options" [Ref. 14:p. 11].
Early planning is the key to the potential success of pro-
duction competition [Ref. ll:p. 157]. Planning must be care-
fully accomplished early so that decisions made in the Concept
Exploration and Demonstration and Validation phases do not
foreclose the future opportunity for production competition.
In other words, the foundation for production competition
should be laid while the program is under the positive influ-
ence of design competition. [Ref. 10 :p. 1-11] In this way,
early decisions support the future production competition
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opportunity. Contractors' responses are also more favorable
in a competitive environment.
The initial contracting strategy, formulated prior to
Milestone I, supports a very broad program acquisition
strategy. It is, therefore, also a broad contracting strategy
concerning future production competition that implements the
Concept Exploration objective of contracting for several
alternative concepts that may satisfy the DOD mission need.
It should, however, address specific contracting issues related
to the Demonstration and Validation phase that could lay the
foundation for future production competition. The contracting
strategy should outline D&V phase solicitation provisions that
will allow maximum future flexibility in the subsequent decision
as to which methodology to pursue that establishes alternative
3production sources, i.e., F , TDP , etc. These provisions
could include, as a minimum:
1. Inform all potential contractors of the Government's
intention to pursue production competition [Ref. 13;
pp. 6-16,22]. This notifies potential contractors
up front that the major weapon system acquisition
process will be competitive, and that technology
transfer will be an eventual requirement. In other
words, contractors will not be surprised later in
the process by the Government's efforts to establish
an alternative source. Contracting officers inter-
viewed stated that previous sole source contractors
frequently employ delaying tactics and other barriers
upon first knowledge of the Government's intention
to develop an alternative source.
2. The requirement for the preparation of a complete
and accurate performance specification to the sub-
system level [Ref. 13:pp. 6-16,22]. This provides
the capability to later decide to utilize the F^
or TDP method.
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3. A requirement to identify and price all proprietary
data, and an option to purchase unlimited data and
data rights [Ref. 14:pp. 6-16,22]. This will facili-
tate any future efforts to transfer technology or
initiate component breakout.
4. A requirement to warrant the developed technical data
package [Ref. 10:p. 8-2]. This will reduce the risk
of inadequate documentation by the contractor.
5. An option to purchase all maintenance items (including
data) needed to support the planned maintenance
concept for the system [Ref. 14:pp. 6-16,22]. This
will allow support and test equipment to also be
produced competitively.
C. THE ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION SOURCING METHOD DECISION
As the program progresses into the D&V phase, technical
and business issues emerge that are used by the Program
Manager and his acquisition management team to select a
methodology for establishing an alternative production
source [Ref. 13 :p. 5-5]. Issues such as the system maintenance
concept, predicted equipment reliability, mission criticality,
and procurement costs versus repair costs are significant
variables to be used in selecting an appropriate methodology.
For example, the requirement for a high degree of organic
repair capability requires methodologies other than Form,
Fit, and Function. [Ref. 13:p. 5-5]. Business issues such as
quantity of production, capacity of the developer, and the
contractual complexity, just to name a few, also affect the
selection. [Ref. l:p. 5-7] Two decision models have been
developed that provide a consistent and structured approach to
selecting an acquisition methodology for establishing alterna-
tive production sources. The first model, developed by
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Benjamin R. Sellers and Dennis S. Parry [Refs. 15,16], provides
a decision matrix comparing characteristics of the acquisition
situation to the five second-sourcing methodologies. The
second model, developed by the Naval Air Systems Command [Ref.
13] , provides a flowchart approach to arriving at the appro-
priate methodology.
Both methods are considered useful by this researcher.
The Program Manager and his acquisition management team,
usually consisting of the Business/Financial Manager, the
Program/Project Engineer, and the contracting officer at a
minimum, will select an appropriate method. It must then be
incorporated into the system acquisition strategy in prepara-
tion for the Milestone II decision point, as required by DOD
and Public Law 98-212. [Refs. 4 , 8] The exception to this
timing is the Contractor Teaming approach, since the nature
of this methodology requires its identification by the D&V
phase. [Ref. 13 ;p. 6-3] The contracting strategy must then
be further refined or reformulated. It must provide the
detailed contracting related strategy that implements the
methodology selected. The remainder of this chapter presents
the researcher's analysis of techniques for formulating this
contracting strategy.
D. CONTRACTING STRATEGY PROGRAM ISSUES
1 . Evaluate Program Characteristics and Issues
Every major weapon system acquisition program consists
of a unique combination of program issues, characteristics,
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requirements, and organizations. Alternative Program Management
Organization (PMO) structures include a fully-staffed inte-
grated PMO, a small PMO supported by headquarters functional
specialists, and a skeleton PMO supported by field level
functional specialists [Ref. 2:p. 2-11]. Each type of organi-
zation has different constraints and abilities that depend
upon both its structure and the personnel involved. Fully-
staffed and integrated PMO's may desire to have more direct
control or involvement with the contractors than a small PMO
that receives functional support from headquarters personnel
in a matrix organization. Additionally, different PMO's
develop their own objectives concerning areas such as its access
to the potential second source and its control over the tech-
nology transfer process. It must also assess potential
contractor's cooperation in the technology transfer process.
[Ref. 2:pp. 8-6, 7] Every major weapon system has its own
set of characteristics, including technical complexity, main-
tenance requirements, and producibility
. These could involve
issues such as configuration control, Government requirement
for technical data and the desire to assume its responsibility,
maintainability, supportability , and risk of successful tech-
nology transfer. These are just a few of the potential unique
program issues and characteristics. Many more are possible,
depending upon the program's acquisition situation. The con-
tracting officer can extract these program issues from the
acquisition strategy, the Program Manager, and the various
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functional strategies. These functional strategies could in-
clude plans such as the Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the
Integrated Logistics Support Plan, and the Systems Engineering
Master Plan. [Ref. 2:p. 4-4] In some instances, the formal
functional implementation plans are also in the formulation
stages, therefore comprehensive documentation may not be
available. In this situation, contracting officers interviewed
by the researcher indicated that they utilize various informa-
tion gathering techniques. The contracting officer attends
many program conferences with members of the PMO concerning
progress, strategy, and program issues. Periodic conferences
are attended with contractor representatives. Information is
obtained from correspondence, reports, and other organizations
such as contract administration offices. Issues may be ob-
tained from, or provided by higher levels, including headquarters,
the Service Secretary's office, and OSD. They are important,
since they will significantly influence how the objectives of
the acquisition strategy are to be pursued by the PMO and the
functional support team. Therefore, the first step in formu-
lating a major weapon system contracting strategy is to consoli-
date as many program production competition-related issues
and characteristics as possible from the various functional
strategies/plans, if available, and from all other available
sources
.
Every major weapon system acquisition program has its
own combination of unique program issues and circumstances
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that influence the contracting strategy. An exhaustive analy-
sis of every possible program issue and its impact upon con-
tracting strategy formulation is beyond the scope of this
research effort. During the course of research, several
program issues were consistently encountered that received
careful analysis during contracting strategy formulation.
These program issues, therefore, will be introduced, and they
include
:
- Technical Data Issues
- PMO Engagement in Establishing Production Competition
- Risk of Technology Transfer
- Contractor (s) Cooperation/Opposition to Production
Competition
- Support for Production Competition
2 . Technical Data Issues
Issues surrounding technical data consistently emerge
in developing a contracting strategy that will promote the
opportunity for, or implement production competition. These
issues typically involve the requirement for technical data
according to the planned maintenance philosophy for the
system [Ref. 13:p. 5-5], the status of the TDP [Ref. 10:
p. 5-4] , and the existence of proprietary technical data
[Ref. 10:p. 5-8].
Every major weapon system has a planned maintenance
philosophy. It can emphasize the requirement for system
design disclosure, or it can negate the requirement. A
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maintenance philosophy that requires only removal and replace-
ment action at the organic level with internal repair at a
contractor depot, or for expendable, nonrepairable items,
allows the contracting officer to place less emphasis upon
technical data issues. A maintenance philosophy that re-
quires repair capability by internal intermediate or depot
repair activities necessitates design disclosure to support
the repair capability. [Ref. 13 :p. 5-5] It also implies that
contractors produce identical equipment to support logistical
af fordability and configuration control requirements. Techni-
cal data issues receive much more consideration in this situa-
tion. The contracting strategy must define how technical data
and processes will be provided to sources other than the system
developer in order for them to produce identical equipment.
The contracting officer must consider the status of
the TDP in formulating a contracting strategy that will trans-
fer technical data and processes. It is a critical considera-
tion under the TDP approach [Ref. 10 :p. 5-4] since the success
of achieving production competition depends upon the availa-
bility of a complete, accurate, and validated TDP. The status
of the TDP for the Phoenix missile program, which had been in
production for several years, was a major issue in the formu-
lation of the contracting strategy for that program's second
sourcing efforts. [Ref. 17] The Phoenix program contracting
officer indicated that following the decision to develop a
second source for the missile by TDP, it was learned that only
50
level two drawings riddled with the developer's unique processes
were available. Additionally, the developer was considered
to be neither capable nor willing to develop an adequate TDP
.
The major thrust of the contracting strategy formulation was,
therefore, centered around the development of the TDP. Con-
versely, the availability of an adequate, validated TDP enabled
the contracting officer for the HARM missile program to
formulate a flexible contracting strategy for second sourcing.
[Ref. 18] She stated that following unsuccessful efforts to
second source the entire missile, she was able to utilize
component breakout and initiate second sourcing for the missile
command launch computer (CLC) . The contracting officer for
the LSD-41 class amphibious ships stated that formulating a
contracting strategy to obtain the ship's detailed design
package was the cornerstone for procuring five of the eight
ships on a competitive basis. [Ref. 19]
The existence of proprietary data can be a significant
factor in formulating a contracting strategy for production
competition. Early planning and actions taken during the
early competitive development phases to identify, price, and
negotiate proprietary data agreements can help limit subsequent
problems in this area. [Ref. 10 :p. 5-8] In situations
where the developing contractor does claim to own proprietary
data for the system, the contracting officer may formulate a
contracting strategy involving a licensing arrangement to
establish a second source. [Ref. 20 :p. 64] Several programs
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have dealt with proprietary data via the licensing approach.
Among these are the Joint Cruise Missile Engine program, the
Reference Measuring Unit and Computer/Inertial Navigation
Element for the Cruise Missile, the Very High Speed Integrated
Circuit program, and the Harrier Aircraft program. [Ref. 20:
p. 6] These programs indicate that given the presence of
proprietary data and the decision to develop alternative pro-
duction sources via licensing, the contracting strategy
formulation process focuses upon issues such as:
- Determination of royalty fees
- Licensee selection
- Developer motivation for licensing
- Licensee qualification
3. Risk of Technology Transfer
Closely related to the issue of technical data is
the issue of technology transfer risk. Risk management is
one of the primary responsibilities of the PM and his support-
ing acquisition team, which includes the contracting officer.
[Ref. 2:p. 4-44] Most methodologies for establishing produc-
tion competition involve the transfer of technical data and/or
manufacturing processes from the system developer to the
potential alternative production source (s). Duplicative
production by sources other than the developer depends upon
the successful transfer of the required technology, i.e.,
successful management of technology transfer risk. The Phoenix
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missile contracting officer stated that the unavailability of
an adequate TDP for a missile that has been in production for
several years greatly increased the risk of technology transfer
in the Phoenix second sourcing effort, particularly since the
second sourcing methodology is by TDP. One of the generic
features of the Contractor Teaming second sourcing methodology
is that technology transfer is the responsibility of the two
team members, therefore problems should be minimized. [Ref
.
10 :p. 5-6] The contracting officer for the Airborne Self-
Protection Jammer (ASPJ) program stated, however, that tech-
nology transfer had become a significant problem in that program,
[Ref. 21] The Government had not forced technology transfer
in the development efforts of the two contractors since they
had formed a joint venture. The Government, not a part of the
joint venture, had not required demonstration of technology
transfer between the two contractors due to cost and schedule
tradeoffs, according to the contracting officer. The program
is now getting ready to transition to limited production, and
lack of technology transfer between the two contractors is a
major issue in the contracting strategy for the limited pro-
duction. In the Navy Extra-High Frequency Satellite Communi-
cation (EHF SATCOM) program, the acquisition strategy has
enumerated production competition throughout the program.
[Ref. 22] The program is characterized by parallel development
by two contractors through the FSD phase for design competition
for a billion dollar, five year Multi-Year Procurement (MYP)
.
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The contracting officer stated that eventual technology trans-
fer was an early program issue, and a provision was included
in the competitive FSD solicitation for the Government to
obtain unlimited rights to technical data and validation and
verification of technical data which allows Government access
to all processes and applications of technical data. [Ref.
22] Programs, such as the HARM missile, that possess a vali-
dated TDP , also possess the classic technology transfer risk
reduction tool. In the HARM program, the contracting officer
stated that the potential second source in possession of the
Government provided CLC TDP, had proposed a seventy thousand
dollar reduction in the previous sole source CLC production
price and was in the process of production qualification at the
time of the interview. The contracting officer for the LSD-41
class ships stated that the availability of a proven detailed
design package, developed during construction of the lead and
second ship, enabled the subsequent competition for the next
annual requirement to result in a savings of almost four
hundred million dollars. [Ref. 19]
4 . Program Management Office Engagement in Establishing
Production Competition
The contracting officer must be sensitive to the amount
of PMO involvement in the process of establishing alternative
production sources while formulating the contracting strategy.
While the various methodologies for establishing alternative
production sources have generic attributes concerning the
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amount of PMO involvement, the contracting officer must also
consider the realities of the specific program in formulating
the contracting strategy. Illustrations of this include the
Phoenix missile program and the ASPJ program. In the Phoenix
program, which utilized the TDP approach, generically the
PMO would experience extensive involvement in the process in
the areas concerning the contents of the TDP, the amount of
developer support required, the second source selection, the
TDP validation and transfer, and the second source qualifica-
tion. [Ref. 10 :p. 10-1] The Phoenix PMO, however, decided
that it was in the best interest of the Government that PMO
involvement be limited in the areas of validation of and
liability for the subsequently developed TDP. The contracting
officer had to accommodate this PMO engagement issue while
formulating the contracting strategy. In the ASPJ program,
the generic nature of the Contractor Teaming approach places
much of the administrative burden on the contractors, thus
limiting PMO administrative involvement. [Ref. 10 :p. 13-5]
The ASPJ contracting officer indicated that the PMO's previous
practice of limited involvement with the contractors in the
joint venture allowed the contractors to minimize their cooper-
ation and technology transfer. iRef. 21] This, in fact, has
resulted in a much heavier burden upon the PMO, as reflected
in the present contracting strategy that is attempting to
restore and accelerate the technology transfer process. PMO
involvement in the SURTASS program shifted direction two times
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[Ref. 23] Following competition for FSD, the system developer
was unable to satisfactorily develop the towed array subsystem
in 1981. Another contractor offered an array to the Navy for
consideration which did work satisfactorily. The Navy broke
the towed array subsystem out and bought it from the other
contractor as GFE to the system developer. In late 1983, the
PMO decided to second source the towed array under the Form,
Fit, and Function technique. The contracting officer stated
that PMO involvement was a factor in contracting strategy
tradeoff decisions, first to break the towed array out rather
than to continue development by the system developer. [Ref.
23] In the second sourcing decision, the contracting officer
stated that a Form, Fit, and Function type contracting strategy
was adopted since the PMO did not have the resources to obtain
technical data or to motivate the array developer to participate
in a second sourcing effort. In the Leader-Follower second
sourcing methodology, the amount of PMO involvement is a pri-
mary concern in the decision as to the contractual relationship
implemented. Under the approach of a Leader-Follower subcon-
tract relationship, the Leader is responsible for technology
transfer, source selection, and for the Follower's initial
deliveries. The administrative burden upon the PMO is thereby
lessened. [Ref. 10: p. 11-3] Under the approach where both
Leader and Follower are awarded prime contracts, PMO involvement
is substantially greater, since the Government is responsible
for coordination for Follower selection and qualification. It
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is also responsible for coordination of a technology transfer
arrangement between the Leader and Follower. Increased PMO
staffing may be required to monitor two contractors and for
additional technical support to manage the technology transfer
effort. [Ref. 10:pp. 11-4,5]
5. Contractor (s) Cooperation/Opposition to Production
Competition
Contractors have not historically demonstrated an
unqualified willingness to participate in the Government's
efforts to establish production competition. The researcher
observed that in almost every program in which the Government
has endeavored to establish production competition, the con-
tractor's participation was obtained under the contractually
imposed pressures of competition. Contractual incentives were
sometimes utilized to ensure continued participation. In
cases where contractor opposition was encountered, contracting
strategies employed techniques such as tying participation
provisions to existing contracts, as in the Phoenix missile
3program, or by issuing a F RFP in spite of the developer's
opposition, as in the Joint Cruise Missile Engine Program and
the Navy's Towed Array program. Even while participating in
the production competition effort, contractors will endeavor to
advance their own position at the expense of competitors.
Contracting strategies must be formulated that limit the impact
of contractor's resistance. In the Phoenix missile program,
the contracting officer stated that the developer was kept
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divorced from the potential second sources to preclude
developer negative influence upon the production competition
effort. [Ref. 17] In the Navy EHF SATCOM program, an economic
price adjustment (EPA) clause was included in the solicitation for
the FSD estimate to complete and the priced production option. Thi
clause was intended to cover real escalation over five percent
during this five year MYP. The contracting officer knew that
one of the competing contractors would propose at least five
percent lower than normal to win the award knowing that if
inflation exceeded five percent, they would invoke the EPA
provision which would, in effect, approximate their original
objective. The other contractor, knowing this probable strategy,
would be forced to propose more conservatively.
6 . Support for Production Competition
The contracting officer should be aware of the level
of support for establishing production competition in a par-
ticular program. This encompasses the position of key officials
within the military service, other services, OSD, Congress
and industry. Actions and decisions that provide either support
or lack of support for the establishment of alternative produc-
tion sources can significantly impact formulation of the con-
tracting strategy. The contracting officer for the ASPJ program
stated that the ASPJ has always been a high visibility program
in that it was one of the first programs to utilize the Con-
tractor Teaming joint venture approach. [Ref. 21] Additionally,
the ASPJ was advertised as the all-purpose, multi-service
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airborne electronic countermeasures equipment, although other
similar equipment was also in production. ASPJ development
problems resulted in funding and schedule difficulties. Politi-
cal support for the program eroded, further aggravating the
funding situation. Finally, the Office of the Secretary of the
Navy directed a major change in the program's acquisition
strategy to retain the joint venture through the low-rate
initial production (LRIP) subphase. The contracting officer
stated that this caused a tremendous impact upon the contract-
ing strategy formulation for production. [Ref. 21] In the
HARM program, the contracting officer indicated that the
original efforts to second source the missile were supported
by the Navy, but not the Air Force, and they had the majority
of the outyear quantities. [Ref. 18] After the SECDEF deci-
sion not to second source the missile, the contracting officer
was still able to fall back to component breakout and second
source the command launch computer . In the Navy EHF SATCOM
program, the contracting officer stated that lack of support
resulted in funding cuts. Additionally, one of the competing
contractors was in danger of leaving the competition because
of development and funding problems. These facts made it clear
to the PMO and the contracting officer that the program would
probably not reach Technical Evaluation (TECHEVAL) in a com-
petitive environment. The contracting strategy was revised
to issue an RFP to both contractors for an FSD estimate to
complete and also for priced production options. In this
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way, if one contractor does not make it, the initial production
prices will have been obtained under the pressures of
competition.
E. THE CONTRACTING STRATEGY ISSUE IDENTIFIER MODEL
1 . Analysis of Program Issues
The contracting officer must proactively identify
program issues that may require special emphasis or treatment
in the contracting strategy and ultimately in the contract
itself. In order to do this, he can analyze the selected
acquisition strategy methodology for establishing alternative
production sources in relation to the list of program issues
presented in Section D of this chapter. By analyzing the suita-
bility of the alternative production sourcing methodology for
accomplishing or accommodating the listed program issues,
the contracting officer can identify those program issues that
are easily accommodated by the selected method, those that
are possible but very difficult to accomplish, those that
appear to be in conflict with the method and those that are
not affected at all. This procedure is illustrated by Figure
4.1.
In using this Contracting Strategy Issue Identifier
Model (CSIIM) , a "+" indicates that the alternative production
sourcing method is well suited to accommodate or accomplish the
specified program issue. An "x" indicates that the program
issue is possible but very difficult to accomplish under the
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CONTRACTING STRATEGY ISSUE IDENTIFIER MODEL
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SUPPORT FOR PRODUCTION
COMPETITION
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+ Suitable for Accomplishment
- Unsuitable for Accomplishment
X Very Difficult to Accomplish
Neutral Impact
LF1 - Leader Subcontract to Follower
LF2 - Both Leader, Follower Primes
F-3 - Form, Fit, Function
TDP - Technical Data Package
LF - Leader-Follower
Source: Developed by the Researcher
DL - Directed Licensing
CT - Contractor Teaming
CB - Component Breakout
DC - Design Competition
Figure 4.1
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the selected method. A "-" indicates that the selected method
is unsuited to accommodate the program issue. A "0" indicates
a neutral impact. It should be noted that the program issue
weightings are not additive. Each program issue is to be
considered independently for the particular methodology.
Analysis of the program issues as they are typically accommo-
dated by the generic nature of the methodologies for establish-
ing production competition supports the weightings assigned in
the CSIIM.
2 . Technical Data Issues Analysis
Systems which have a planned maintenance philosophy
that requires military service repair capability at the organic,
intermediate and/or depot levels, and that require function-
ally and logistically interchangeable configurations can be
suitably accomplished by all the detailed design disclosure
production competition methodologies [Ref. 13:p. 5-2]. Con-
ducting design competition (DC) for production would also
support the maintenance requirement since the detailed design
3is the basis upon which the competition is held. The F
methodology may be difficult to implement in this area, since
it is not concerned with the internal design of the equipment.
The system must only meet performance specifications and meet
size, power, weight, cooling, and interface requirements.
3While very difficult, the F methodology has been used to estab-
lish production competition and supported the maintenance
requirement. In the Alternate Fighter Engine program, the
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maintenance support equipment and facilities were made adapta-
ble to both configurations and the maintenance personnel were
also trained for both. [Ref. 10 :p. 9-6]
The unavailability of a validated TDP is not a factor
in the Directed Licensing, Contractor Teaming, and Design
Competition approaches. Under these approaches, the develop-
ment of the TDP is one of the purposes of the methdology, the
developer licenses the second source to use proprietary data,
or the systems are already developed. Data availability is
3
not an issue in the F method. The Leader-Follower method is
suited for establishing production competition without a vali-
dated data package since technology transfer is achieved through
direct technical assistance from the developer (Leader) to the
second source (Follower) either through a subcontract relation-
ship or through an engineering support service contract with
the Leader when the Follower is also a prime contractor.
[Ref. 10 :p. 11-1] Since the validated TDP is the primary basis
for technology transfer under the TDP approach, TDP unavailability
can cause major difficulties. Those difficulties can only
be overcome by efforts to develop a validated TDP. Techniques
have been developed for validating the available data through
joint industry-Government validation, Government independent
validation, and validation through provision of available data,
a performance specification, and a current model of the system.
[Ref. 13:pp. 6-5,9] Component breakout efforts may encounter
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the same difficulties as the TDP approach in developing
alternate suppliers.
Directed Licensing is the only method specifically
3
adapted to transfer proprietary data. F and Design Compe-
tition are not affected, since technical data does not
influence the ability to conduct production competition.
The existence of proprietary data precludes the use of the
other methodologies, since they depend upon voluntary, uncom-
pensated transfer of technology.
3 . Risk of Technology Transfer Analysis
3Technology transfer does not occur in the F and Design
Competition, thus, no impact. The TDP method is suited to
reducing the risk of technology transfer, since the stand-
alone TDP should enable second sources to translate it to their
own processes. The Directed Licensing approach has as a pri-
mary characteristic that technology transfer is the responsi-
bility of the Licensor. Technology transfer risk is reduced
under the Contractor Teaming approach since the system is under
joint development and both contractors will have to demonstrate
production capability for the entire system. The Leader-
Follower approach, where the Leader subcontracts with the
Follower, is suited to technology transfer risk reduction,
since the Leader is responsible contractually for Follower
production qualification and its initial deliveries. [Ref.
10 :p. 11-3] In the Leader-Follower approach, where both the
Leader and Follower have prime contracts, it may prove difficult
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to accomplish technology transfer risk reduction. The Follower
may be unacceptable to the Leader, the technology transfer
agreement may not be adequate, and there is na direct linkage
between the Leader and Follower. [Ref. 10:pp. 11-4,8] Com-
ponent Breakout techniques can experience the same advantages
and difficulties as the method utilized to effect the tech-
nology transfer.
4 . Program Management Office Engagement in Establishing
Production Competition Analysis
If the PMO has both the resources and the objective
of a high degree of engagement in the process of establishing
production competition, any of the methodologies are suitable.
Difficulties arise when the PMO, due to resource and/or objec-
tive constraints, desires to limit its involvement in the
process. Methods that require a high degree of PMO involvement
for functions such as source selection, source qualification,
contract monitoring, data package validation, equipment
certification, and other activities associated with prime con-
tracts may not be suited for low PMO involvement. These
3include F , TDP , Leader-Follower (both prime contractors),
and Design Competition. Component Breakout may be difficult
to accomplish with limited PMO involvement if a new source for
the component must be developed by the Government under a
prime contract characterized by the aforementioned methods.
Although the inherent nature of the Contractor Teaming method
limits the administrative burden of the PMO, it is still a very
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complicated endeavor. [Ref. 10 :p. 13-1] Problems will cer-
tainly emerge over time that will place increasing burdens
upon PMO resources. The generic nature of the Leader-Follower
(Leader subcontracts with the Follower) and the Directed
Licensing approaches enable them to accommodate low PMO engage-
ment. Under these two approaches, the Leader and the Licensor
are contractually responsible for the progress, technology
transfer, and deliveries of initial production from the
respective Follower and Licensee.
5 . Contractor (s) Cooperation/Opposition to Production
Competition Analysis
Contractor-to-contractor cooperation is not required
under the F , TDP, and Design Competition approaches. The
Leader-Follower (Leader subcontracts with the Follower)
,
Directed Licensing, and Contractor Teaming approaches have
all been characterized as methods that enhance the cooperation
between the contractors, particularly when the contractors
have participated in the responsibility for selection of the
second source. The Leader-Follower (both prime contractors)
approach may encounter cooperation difficulties, since there
is no direct linkage between the contractors. Additionally,
if the Leader did not participate in the Follower selection,
he may be reluctant to cooperate with the Follower. Contrac-
tor cooperation difficulties could arise in a component break-
out effort as well, depending upon source availability and
the technology transfer methodology employed.
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Any methodology for establishing production competi-
tion that experiences aggressive developer opposition will
3have difficulties. F , TDP , and Design Competition have the
best chance for success in that they may be employed independent
of the developer, thus minimizing the impact of his opposition.
All the other methodologies will experience difficulties in
proportion to the degree of contractor-to-contractor coopera-
tion required and the level of control or influence exercised
by the developer over the second source.
6 . Support for Production Competition Analysis
Programs with a high level of support have a much
greater chance for success than those that experience erosion
of support. This is easily stated, however, the contracting
strategy must often provide the vehicle for progress where
support is lacking with subsequent program instability. Any
erosion of program support can indicate the need for immediate
contingency planning.
The program issues that result in a "X" or a "-" are
areas where potential contracting difficulties may be encoun-
tered. The contracting officer can thus proactively formulate
a contracting strategy that best accommodates the identified
issues in the CSIIM. This may be accomplished by emphasizing
the issue in the source selection criteria, by inclusion of
special clauses or provisions in the solicitation, or by
development of contractual incentives.
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F. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the contracting strategy as a
tool that can make a significant contribution to creating a
positive foundation for future production competition.
Even though the system is not well-defined during the
Concept Exploration phase , contractual provisions in the
areas of performance specifications, data/data rights, and
maintenance items in the Demonstration and Validation phase
solicitation can hold open the future opportunity for produc-
tion competition.
During the Demonstration and Validation phase, as the
system becomes more defined, preparation for the Milestone
II decision point must include the program decision concern-
ing which methodology to employ to establish an alternative
production source. Two decision models were identified that
can provide assistance to the Program Manager and his acqui-
sition management team in that decision process.
Given an alternative production sourcing methodology, the
contracting officer must formulate a detailed functional con-
tracting strategy through which to implement it. A technique
was analyzed by the researcher through which the contracting
officer evaluates program issues which the research consis-
tently encountered in contracting strategy formulation in
relation to the selected alternative production sourcing method
to determine its suitability and/or to identify potential con-
tracting problem areas in accommodating the program issues.
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The contracting officer then formulates a tailored contracting
strategy that addresses the potential problem areas identified
in the CSIIM. Contractual methods such as source selection
criteria emphasis, special clauses or provisions, incentives,
or other applicable procedures may be utilized. The resultant
contracting strategy reflects a proactive effort by the con-
tracting officer to accumulate multi-functional program
issues, evaluate them in relation to acquisition strategy
objectives, identify potential barriers to production compe-
tition, and to formulate a contractual strategy that will
eliminate those barriers.
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V. CONTRACTING STRATEGY ISSUE IDENTIFIER MODEL UTILIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate and analyze
the use of the Contracting Strategy Issue Identifier Model
(CSIIM) in formulating a contracting strategy for production
competition in major weapon systems acquisition. Two actual
programs will be presented for application of the CSIIM;
the Navy's Phoenix missile program, and the Navy-led, Extra-
High Frequency Satellite Communication (EHF SATCOM) program.
For each program, the general situation will be presented as
related to the researcher by PMO personnel and the program
contracting officer. Next, the program issues that the
research identified as consistently requiring consideration
in contracting strategy formulation will be discussed as
they relate to the specific program. Finally, for each
program, the CSIIM will be applied to the programs and
analyzed against the actual contracting officer's contracting
strategy.
B. THE PHOENIX MISSILE PROGRAM
1 . General
The Navy's Phoenix missile program has been in pro-
duction for several years. According to the PMO, the system
had not demonstrated the level of performance and quality
desired, and the following trends had been observed:
70
- The developer's costs were not progressing down a
learning curve anywhere near the expected rate.
- Even though the system has been in production for several
years, quality and performance problems have necessitated
continued system development.
- This continued development effort by the developer
appeared excessively slow.
- A technical baseline and configuration control was
virtually non-existent, and a change rate of two
hundred percent had been experienced. The Government
has been buying the missile under performance
specifications
.
- The developer had been very unresponsive to the PMO's
efforts to accelerate development, improve efficiency
and performance, and to establish a firm technical
baseline
.
In mid-1984, the decision was made, despite the PMO's
reluctance, to develop a second source for the missile. The
developer expressed immediate opposition. The Leader-Follower
and Licensing methods were rejected due to the developer's
opposition and the PMO's lack of confidence in the developer's
3
ability to transfuse technology. The F method was rejected
due to the complexity of the missile and logistics considera-
tions. The TDP approach was selected as the methodology for
establishing a second source for the missile.
2 . Technical Data Issues
A complete, level three technical data package for
the missile was unavailable. The contracting officer stated
that a key Government shortcoming in the missile development was
that the Government failed to specify the requirement for a
level three data package. He also stated that the Government
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failed to monitor the development of a data package and did
not enforce data submission requirements. The result was an
incomplete level two data package that was riddled with the
developer's unique legends and processes. There was no
strategy in existence for the establishment of a technical base-
line or for either Government or industry configuration con-
trol. The PMO did not consider the Government to be in a
position to require the developer to produce an adequate TDP





Technology transfer risk was significant. The developer
opposed the idea of second sourcing the missile and was,
therefore, unwilling to give up technology. The PMO also
questioned the developer's ability to transfer technology even
if it desired to do so. Further increasing the risk was the
selection of the TDP approach without not only possession of,
but also the existence of an adequate, validated TDP.
4 Program Management Office Engagement in Establishing
Production Competition
The PMO appeared willing and able to expend the
necessary involvement to achieve establishment of the second
source. They did, however, express the intention to limit
PMO involvement in the areas of TDP validation and the
resulting liability for the TDP.
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5.
Contractor (s) Cooperation/Opposition to Production
Competition
The PMO indicated that they desired to divorce the
developer from the potential second sources as much as
possible. They did not want the developer to exercise any
control or to project a negative influence over the process.
The PMO did recognize the fact that some developer engineering
assistance would be necessary due to the status of the techni-
cal data package. Both the PMO and the contracting officer
felt that this would limit the impact of the developer's
opposition to the second sourcing effort.
6 Support for Production Competition
Support for the second sourcing effort was present
within the Navy, however, this was not reflected in the funding
level. The Navy Secretariat, in fact, was about to reduce
the funding level for the program due to the anticipated
forces of competition. The contracting officer expressed the
opinion that since the program was directed to second source
the missile and the appropriate funding was not available,
the break-even point for the competition would be far in the
future. He expected resistence, therefore, at the OSD and
Congressional levels. Additionally, he stated that industry
was skeptical about such effort when they did not see funding
in the appropriation bills.
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C. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE PHOENIX MISSILE PROGRAM
1 . The Contracting Strategy Issue Identifier Model
and Technical Data Package
The Phoenix missile program office utilized the TDP
approach to establish a second source for the missile. The
TDP portion of the generic CSIIM is extracted to produce a
TDP CSIIM as presented in Figure 5.1.
Utilizing the generic TDP CSIIM as a tool to identify
program issues that will require special emphasis or cause
potential problems in contracting strategy formulation for
the Phoenix missile, the contracting officer could surmise
the following:
- Emphasis and attention must be provided in the area
of technical data, more specifically concerning the
status of the TDP. This is a fundamental weakness and
must be accommodated in order to effectively pursue the
TDP approach. Problems should not be encountered in the
area of maintenance philosophy. If a proprietary data
issue emerges, the TDP approach would not be suitable.
- The risk in achieving technology transfer should be
suitably reduced under the generic TDP approach.
- As the amount of the PMO involvement in the TDP process
is increasingly limited, the degree of emphasis in the
contracting strategy will increase.
- Contractor (s) cooperation is not a factor, and the TDP
approach acceptably limits the impact of the developer's
opposition to the effort.
- The degree of support for the second sourcing effort
must be assessed to determine the impact upon contract-
ing strategy formulation. Anything but a high level
of support indicates required attention and/or contingency
planning.
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TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND THE CONTRACTING
STRATEGY ISSUE IDENTIFIER MODEL
PROGRAM ISSUE TDP
TECHNICAL DATA ISSUES
Military Service Maintenance Required +
Validated TDP Unavailable X
Proprietary Data Exists
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER RISK REDUCTION +








Limit Developer Opposition +
SUPPORT FOR PRODUCTION COMPETITION
High +
Low X
LEGEND: + Suitable for Accomplishment
Unsuitable for Accomplishment
X Very Difficult to Accomplish
Neutral Impact
Source: Developed by the Researcher
Figure 5.1
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2 . Phoenix Missile Program Contracting Strategy
The actual contracting strategy for establishing
alternative production sources for the Phoenix missile did
focus upon the program issues identified in the TDP CSIIM
that should receive special emphasis, i.e., the unvalidated
data package, PMO desire to limit its involvement in the subse-
quent data package validation and the liability for it, and
an awareness of the political attitudes surrounding the
effort. [Ref. 17]
In the area concerning the unvalidated data package,
which was the main thrust of the contracting strategy, a
reprocurement data package will be developed by the two poten-
tial second sources utilizing available data and a missile
provided by the Government. The resulting TDP will be pre-
sented by the potential second sources in the form of a
proposal. The Government will select the most promising
proposal for possible subsequent production qualification.
Technology transfer risk reduction was not an issue
identified in the TDP CSIIM for emphasis in contracting strategy
formulation. It should be noted that the TDP CSIIM reflects
the generic attributes of the TDP approach, which assumes that
a validated TDP is available. Technology transfer is accom-
plished at low risk through the validated TDP. In the Phoenix
program, however, this was not possible due to the state of
the data. The contracting strategy accommodated the issue by
utilizing the engineering and design capabilities of two
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potential second sources to develop the TDP , thus enhancing
the chance of successful TDP development.
The contracting strategy accommodated the PMO objec-
tive of limited involvement in the TDP validation by including
a provision that would require the system developer to actually
produce the missile in its plant according to the TDP developed
by the potential second source. In order to limit the Govern-
ment's liability, the contracting strategy called for the
TDP proposal to be called a Certified Technical Baseline by
the potential second sources. The TDP CSIIM also identifies
limited PMO involvement as a program issue of concern to the
contracting strategy.
The generic TDP CSIIM indicates that contractor-to-
contractor cooperation has no impact, since under the generic
TDP approach, the availability of a validated TDP eliminates
the need for contractor-to-contractor interaction. The Phoenix
contracting strategy did, in fact, maintain contractor separation
by forming a Government liaison team to perform communication
and resolve contractor's technical questions. The impact of
the developer's opposition to the second sourcing effort was
limited by the TDP approach, by divorcing it from the poten-
tial second sources. Any involvement required of the developer
was tied to its current production contract, and the engineer-
ing support services were delivered to the Government, not to
a potential competitor.
The contracting officer stated that based upon the
mixed level of support anticipated for the Phoenix second
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sourcing effort, he was about to coordinate with PMO personnel
in efforts to identify future options for maintaining the
production quantity and also to accelerate the anticipated
break-even point.
The researcher concludes that the TDP CSIIM does
identify program issues that the contracting officer had to
formulate innovative contracting techniques to accommodate.
The unusual situation where the TDP approach was employed
without the availability of a validated TDP accounts for the
variation in the technology transfer risk and contractor (s)
cooperation program issues.
D. THE EXTRA-HIGH FREQUENCY SATELLITE COMMUNICATION PROGRAM
1. General
The Extra-High Frequency Satellite Communication (EHF
SATCOM) program is a Navy-led program to procure MILSTAR
satellite compatible communication terminals for all the mili-
tary services. It is a billion dollar program that will pursue
a five year MYP contract, if Congress approves the request.
The acquisition strategy has enumerated production competition
as an objective since program initiation. In that a MYP is
anticipated, the methodology employed for production compe-
tition has been parallel development through the FSD phase
for design competition for the MYP production award. FSD runs
through the year 1987. The program had been running satisfac-
torily until a combination of funding cuts and slower than
78
expected technical progress by one of the competing contractors
made it clear that the program would not be able to reach
TECHEVAL with both contractors competing. The decision was
made to revise the acquisition strategy and conduct produc-
tion competition during FSD. At the time of the interview
with the contracting officer, a solicitation had been issued
to the two contractors requesting an estimate to complete for




Availability of a validated TDP and proprietary data
were not issues in the program. The Government had provisions
in the FSD contract for unlimited rights to all technical
data and had a validation and verification provision, which
allows the Government access to the contractor's manufacturing
processes, applications, and data. A maintenance philosophy
requiring military service maintenance capability is also
supported under this detailed design disclosure methodology.
3 Risk of Technology Transfer
Technology transfer is not an issue in the EHF SATCOM
program, since it is utilizing parallel and separate develop-
ment through FSD for design competition for a MYP production
award.
4. Program Management Office Engagement in Establishing
Production Competition
"
The contracting officer stated that the PMO had not
indicated, either through meetings or documentation, any
desire or reason to limit its involvement in the design
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Contractor (s) Cooperation/Opposition to Production
Competition
Under the separate and parallel development approach,
contractor-to-contractor cooperation is neither required
nor desired. Neither contractor had exhibited any actions
that would oppose the effort for production competition.
6 Support for Production Competition
Support for the production competition effort was
perceived, however this support did not extend to the program
funding. Funding levels had been reduced and was a major
factor in the decision to conduct the competition for the
producing contractor during FSD.
E. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE EXTRA-HIGH FREQUENCY
SATELLITE COMMUNICATION PROGRAM
1. The Contracting Strategy Issue Identifier Model and
Design Competition for Production Competition
The EHF SATCOM program utilized the Design Competition
approach to establish production competition for the satellite
communication terminals. The Design Competition portion of
the generic CSIIM is extracted to produce a Design Competition
CSIIM as in Figure 5.2.
Utilizing the generic Design Competition CSIIM as a
tool to identify program issues that will require special
emphasis or cause potential problems in contracting strategy
80








TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER RISK REDUCTION








Limit Developer Opposition +





LEGEND: + Suitable for Accomplishment
Unsuitable for Accomplishment
X Very Difficult to Accomplish
Neutral Impact
Source: Developed by the Researcher
Figure 5.2
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formulation, the EHF SATCOM contracting officer could surmise
the following:
- All the technical data issues are either suitably
accommodated or not an issue due to the generic nature
of the Design Competition approach.
- Technology transfer is not a factor when contractors
compete designs in separate and parallel development
through FSD.
- A high level of PMO involvement is required due to the
responsibilities it must cover in managing at least
two separate contracts. Limiting PMO involvement would
jeopardize the effectiveness of the approach.
- Separate parallel development for design competition
eliminates the requirement for contractor (s) cooperation
or interaction. Contractors opposed to the design
competition would most probably not enter the process.
Separate parallel development limits the impact of
any contractor's opposition to the process.
- A high level of support for the process enhances its
probability for success. As support erodes, the negative
impact requires that the contracting strategy be formulated
so as to obtain as many benefits from competition as
possible while the competitive environment exists.
2 . The Extra-High Frequency Satellite Communication
Program Contracting Strategy
The actual contracting strategy for the EHF SATCOM
program that was formulated as a result of the acquisition
strategy revision in FSD did react to the issue of low pro-
gram support that is identified in the Design Competition
CSIIM. All other program issues in the contracting strategy
followed the generic nature of the Design Competition approach
and did not receive noteworthy attention. The PMO's involve-
ment was not limited, therefore, that issue did not apply.
[Ref. 22]
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As a result of the erosion of program support,
reduced funding, and lack of performance by one of the com-
peting contractors, the decision was made to conduct the
competition to select the producer during FSD. The solici-
tation was worded in such a way that, while not biased toward
either contractor, it took advantage of the two contractors
well-known proposal pricing practices (one historically low,
the other historically expensive). Therefore, the production
prices would be obtained under competitive pressures and no
matter which contractor won the competition, a price baseline
had been established. The contracting strategy thus obtained
as many benefits of competition as possible while the competi-
tive environment existed.
The researcher concludes that while the Design Compe-
tition CSIIM did not identify a number of problem program
issues for contracting strategy formulation, a number of
problem program issues did not, in fact, exist. It did
reflect the impact of low program support.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the utilization of the CSIIM
by application and analysis of the technique in two actual
major weapon systems acquisition programs. The results of
the application and analysis of the CSIIM utility indicate that
it is a useful tool in analyzing those program issues that
this research has identified that most consistently emerge in
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contracting strategy formulation. It also demonstrated
that unique program characteristics may develop program
issues that are uncharacteristic of the selected generic
methodology for establishing production competition. In
these instances, the CSIIM must receive additional analysis
beyond the generic attributes displayed in the model.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions were developed as a result of
this research effort.
The contracting strategy is critical in implementing a
major weapon system acquisition strategy , however, there is no
formal guidance for preparation of or a requirement for a
separate contracting strategy document (plan) .
As discussed in Chapter II, the contracting strategy is
a subset of the Business/Financial functional implementation
plan that addresses the contractually-related program issues.
In order for the contract to ultimately cover all the objectives
and requirements included in the other functional implementation
plans, the contracting strategy must serve to integrate those
objectives and requirements into the acquisition plan.
The role of the contracting officer in acquisition strategy
development and implementation is not uniform in major v/eapon
systems acquisition.
Since there is no formal recognition of the contracting
strategy and its role in integrating program requirements and
objectives, the contracting officer has no established means
to uniformly formulate a contracting strategy and an acquisi-
tion plan. The contracting officer's participation in acquisi-
tion plan development, in fact, varies from program-to-program.
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In some instances, the contracting officer is responsible for
its development, while in others, the contracting officer
provides an input to the Program Manager.
Establishing production competition in programs already in
production requires the same planning and actions as required
when production competition is pursued during the pre-production
phases
.
The complexity and expense of today's major weapon systems
do not lend themselves to impulsive or under-planned initiation
of production competition. Careful planning and actions that
will accommodate issues such as technology transfer, required
resources, program support and political attitudes, schedules,
and industry availability/interest must be accomplished in
order to effectively achieve production competition. Actions
initiated in earlier acquisition phases may take advantage of
more available options and longer time to accomplish logical
planning. Once a program is in the production phase options
are limited, time is a constraint, and the benefits of compe-
tition are more vague.
Decisions involving production competition are frequently
made at levels above both the contracting officer and the
Program Manager .
Programs discussed in Chapters IV and V illustrate the
frequency and impact of decisions made by these levels upon
the available options for establishing production competition.
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Contracting officers must be consistently sensitive to
emerging higher level attitudes.
Program issues concerning technical data, risk of tech-
nology transfer, PMO engagement in establishing production
competition, contractor cooperation/opposition to production
competition, and support for production competition exist that
are consistently encountered and must be considered by the
contracting officer during contracting strategy formulation .
As presented in Chapter IV, this research effort consis-
tently encountered the program issues of technical data, tech-
nology transfer risk reduction, PMO engagement in establishing
production competition, contractor (s) cooperation/opposition
to production competition, and support for production competi-
tion. Careful analysis of these issues in relation to the
methodology employed for establishing production competition,
by a technique such as the CSIIM, can assist the contracting
officer in identifying areas of special concern in contracting
strategy formulation.
It is possible to model major issues involved in production
competition in relation to the principal second sourcing
acquisition methodologies .
Chapter IV presented the program issues consistently
encountered by this research effort during contracting strategy
formulation and a discussion relating them to the feasible
methodologies for establishing production competition. A
model was then developed to depict the feasible methodologies'
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suitability for accomplishing or accommodating the program
issues. This model can be used to identify those consistently
encountered program issues that will require careful analysis
during contracting strategy formulation.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are relevant from this
research effort.
The contracting officer's role in the integration of
the various functional implementation plans should be formally
recognized .
The FAR and Service implementing directives and instructions
should be revised to give the contracting officer formal
recognition and authority for being the focal point for inte-
gration of program objectives and requirements into acquisition
plans. The responsibility of the PM would not be diminished,
since the PM is still responsible for the development of the
various functional strategies/plans. Once developed, the con-
tracting officer should be recognized as the integrator.
The contracting strategy should be recognized separately
from the Business/Financial strategy/plan .
The researcher recognizes the interrelationship between
the two, however, the criticality of the contracting strategy
justifies separation. Contracting strategy issues become
overshadowed and diluted by budgetary considerations when the
Business/Financial Plan contains both areas. The FAR, DOD
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FAR Supplement, and Service directives and instructions
should be revised to separate the two, and to require a
formally prepared and approved Contracting Plan. In this
manner, contracting strategy issues will be considered
proactively
.
The Contracting Strategy Issue Identifier Model should
be used in formulating contracting strategies and in evaluating
the feasible methodologies for establishing production
competition .
The model should be used early in the acquisition cycle
for major weapon systems acquisition to formulate the initial
contracting strategy for establishing production competition.
It should be thereafter evaluated on a consistent basis in
relation to program changes and any generic variations to the
selected methodology for establishing production competition.
The methodology for contracting strategy formulation
through utilization of the Constracting Strategy Issue Identi -
fier Model technique, as set forth in this thesis, should be
tested and evaluated .
The technique presented in Chapter IV provides a potential
management tool for use by the contracting officer during con-
tracting strategy formulation. The utility of this model
should be further explored.
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C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is a contracting strategy, and., what is the
contracting officer's role in a major weapon system
acquisition?
The contracting strategy is the procurement portion of
the Business/Financial functional strategy. It provides
immediate detailed approaches to acquisition strategy contrac-
tually-related resource concerns. The acquisition strategy
provides the conceptual framework for program execution through-
out the program's life. Each procurement action during the
program requires an acquisition plan that implements the program
objectives within the acquisition strategy framework. The
acquisition plan is developed by integrating the various func-
tional implementation plans that detail the specific actions
for the instant procurement action. The contracting strategy
performs this integration by translating the various functional
implementation plan's objectives and requirements into the
elements that will ultimately be included in a contract
solicitation.
2. What are the principal contracting characteristics of
production competition, and what are the feasible
production competition options/alternatives?
The feasible production competition options/alterna-
tives are Form, Fit, and Function, Technical Data Package,
Leader-Follower, Directed Licensing, Contractor Teaming,
Component Breakout, and Design Competition for Produc-
tion Competition. Each is its own characteristics and
advantages as outlined in Chapter III. Major weapon systems
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are usually developed for unique military requirements,
involve state-of-the-art technology, require lengthy develop-
ment time, and are very expensive. This implies that consider-
ations such as technology transfer, interaction between
competitors, planned maintenance philosophies, ownership of
technical data, award methodologies, the number of competitions
to hold, and the number of suppliers to maintain over time
must be carefully analyzed and contractually implemented.
3. What contingent characteristics of major weapon
systems acquisition pre-production phases might
substantively jeopardize the structure, nature and
emphasis of the production competition strategy?
Early planning and action is the key to successful and
effective establishment of production competition. Actions
such as those presented in Chapter IV that provide future
flexibility in the alternative production sourcing methodology
decision can help preclude many difficulties encountered in
the late FSD and production phases. Additionally, as discussed
in Chapter V, funding is an area of consistent concern. Fund-
ing instability can cause tremendous barriers to establishing
production competition.
4. What are the contracting issues that must be considered
from a political, legal, economic, and regulatory
perspective in formulating and implementing a
production competition strategy?
This research effort consistently encountered the issues
presented in Chapter IV that require analysis during contracting
formulation. They are:
Technical Data Issues
Risk of Technology Transfer
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PMO Engagement in Establishing Production Competition
Contractor (s) Cooperation/Opposition to Production
Competition
Support for Production Competition
Do RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A separate study should be conducted to determine the
characteristics and utility of the Component Breakout
methodology to further enhance the acquisition research body
of knowledge.
Studies should be conducted to expand the list of consis-
tently encountered program issues that affect contracting
strategy formulation.
A study should be conducted that provides a detailed analy-
sis of establishing production competition for programs already




1. At what point did you become involved with the program
acquisition strategy? What was your role?
2. What program documents, i.e., JMSNS , PDM, POM, Other
program functional plans, characteristics and regulatory
requirements did you consider in formulating the contract-
ing strategy?
3. Does this technique vary from program to program?
4. Describe the major internal and external factors that
impact a major weapon system contracting strategy, i.e.,
SYSCOM, PMO internal, political, economic factors.
5. How much flexibility did you have in formulating the
contracting strategy?
6. Describe the acquisition plan approval process? Relate
any problem areas encountered in the approval process.
7. When was production competition targeted in the acquisi-
tion strategy?
8. Describe the effect of production competition upon the
contracting strategy.
9. What are the key contractual issues to be considered and/
or resolved in pre-production phases that plot an early
course toward production competition?
10. What programmatical , contractual and policy events or
changes arose during early phases that significantly
affected the contracting strategy?
11. How were these issues resolved?
12. When was the technology transfer method selected, imple-
mented, and what were the problems encountered in
implementation?
13. How were you involved?
14. How often are the acquisition strategy and acquisition
plan updated?
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15. Describe unique contractual provisions that facilitate
technology transfer in the methodology implemented?
16. How has pre-production phase competition facilitated
production competition?
17. How is the contracting strategy/plan integrated with
the other various functional implementation plans?
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